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Too Many Motions for Vacatur of
Commercial Arbitration Awards?
The Eleventh Circuit Sanctions
Unwary Litigants
B.L. Harbert International, LLC v. Hercules Steel Company'
I. INTRODUCTION
In B.L. Harbert Int'l. v. Hercules Steel Co., the Eleventh Circuit Court of Ap-
peals seemed angered by what they deemed to be another frivolous appeal of a
commercial arbitration award. Upon this provocation, the court warned litigants
that future baseless appeals would be met with sanctions. 2 By making sanctions a
real threat, the court has attempted to promote some goals of arbitration, including
finality, but any benefits derived may be offset by the increased confusion the
holding has created. Further, the court's mandate represents a divergence from
Eleventh Circuit precedent, as past decisions indicated a willingness to hear new
arguments and new theories. The court's holding will not cap the number of
claims for vacatur as litigants with legitimate claims will merely modify their
arguments to accommodate the new standard.
II. FACTS & HOLDING
B.L. Harbert International, LLC (Harbert), is an Alabama-based corporation
involved in financing construction projects.3 On August 25, 2000, the Army
Corps of Engineers awarded Harbert a contract to construct an office complex at
Fort Bragg, North Carolina.4 Thereafter, on September 21, 2000, Harbert granted
Hercules Steel Company (Hercules) a fabrication and erection subcontract worth
$1,197,000. 5 The subcontract specified that all disputes would be submitted to
binding arbitration under the Construction Industry Arbitration Rules. 6 A separate
Agreement to Arbitrate stipulated that the Federal Arbitration Act7 (FAA) would
control the arbitration proceedings. 8
The subcontract stipulated that Hercules should proceed according to a
schedule prepared by Harbert. 9 The contract further provided that Harbert would
1. 441 F.3d 905 (11 th Cir. 2006).
2. Id. at 913-14.
3. Id. at 907.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. The subcontract stipulated that the arbitration would be "under the auspices of the American
Arbitration Association." Id.
7. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
8. Harbert, 441 F.3d at 907.
9. Id.
1
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prepare a progress schedule for each subcontractor that could be amended "from
time to time with the Subcontractor's input." 10 Failure to complete any assigned
projects within the project schedule's timelines would result in liability for dam-
ages." The subcontract did not define the terms "progress schedule" or "project
schedule," and noted no tangible distinction between the two. 12 Harbert created
two schedules, referred to as the 2000 and 3000 schedules. 13 The initial dispute
arose over confusion as to which schedule was binding.
14
The completion dates for the 2000 schedule were earlier than those of the
3000 schedule. 15 The 2000 schedule stipulated a start date of March 5, 2001, and
a completion date of June 6, 2001.16 Hercules began work in April of 2001, and
completed their projects in January of 2002.17 This completion date was late for
the 2000 schedule, but within the deadlines stipulated by the 3000 schedule.
18
According to Harbert, Hercules' work was untimely, so Harbert stopped making
payments under the subcontract. 19 Consequently, Hercules filed a demand for
arbitration seeking the balance due on the subcontract, interest, other damages,
and attorney's fees. 20 Harbert counterclaimed for acceleration costs, back charges,
delay damages, interest, and attorney's fees.
21
In arbitration, Hercules argued that only the 3000 schedule was applicable to
their subcontract. 22 Hercules contended that the subcontract language was am-
biguous as it referred to both a "progress schedule" and a "project schedule," but
23failed to define ether term. According to Harbert, however, the 2000 schedule
applied to all of its subcontractors, and consequently, Hercules was bound by the
2000 deadlines. 24 On September 8, 2004, the arbitrator awarded Hercules the
balance and interest on the subcontract, and denied all other claims and counter-
25claims. After realizing that the award was nearly $100,000 less than the amount
the parties had originally agreed to, Hercules submitted a request for clarification
26from the arbitrator. Harbert also moved for clarification and modification of the
















25. Id. The balance and interest totaled $369,775. Id. The parties chose the Honorable Frank H.
McFadden as arbitrator. Judge McFadden served as a justice for the United States District Court for
the Northern District of Alabama. He also served as general counsel for an Alabama construction
company after his time spent on the district court. Id. at 908 n.1.
26. Id. at 908. "Hercules believed that the arbitrator had made a scrivener's or mathematical error."
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the specific claims were granted or denied.27 On October 18, 2004, the arbitrator
modified the original award, granting Hercules the additional $100,000 requested,
and explained that Harbert had no claims based upon untimely progress because
Hercules was bound only by the more generous 3000 schedules.28
On November 18, 2004, Harbert filed a motion in the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Alabama. 29 Harbert asked the court to dismiss
the arbitration award on a theory of manifest disregard of the law.30 Hercules
countered with a motion seeking confirmation of the award under the provisions
of the FAA.3 1 On February 7, 2005, the district court entered an order denying
Harbert's motion and granting Hercules' motion to confirm. 32 The court assumed
the arbitrator's findings, concluding that Hercules was bound by the 3000 sched-
ule, not the 2000 schedule, and that Hercules' conduct did not breach the terms of
the subcontract.33 Harbert then filed a notice of appeal and a motion for a stay of
judgment pending the appeal. 34
On February 28, 2006, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court. 35 The court held that the arbi-
trator had not acted in manifest disregard of the law, 36 that frivolous appeals in
response to arbitration losses undermined the goals of the FAA, and, in the future,
similar appeals would be met with sanctions.
37
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. The FAA & Vacatur of Commercial Arbitration Awards
The Federal Arbitration Act provides a framework for commercial arbitration
at the federal level. The FAA attempts to promote the presumed goals of arbitra-
tion, including: speed, low-costs, party autonomy, privatization, arbitrator exper-
tise, neutrality, finality, and fair hearings.38 In order to promote these goals and
bolster the pro-arbitration policy of the FAA, judicial review of arbitration awards
is limited.39 The FAA attempts to give the contracting parties what they bargained
for in the arbitration agreement. 40 In essence, the contracting parties have traded
some degree of certainness that the correct outcome has been reached for the low
27. Id. at 908-09. Harbert asked for clarification of six issues including: "What was the schedule to
which Hercules was bound under its subcontract with Harbert?" Id. at 909.








35. Id. at 914.
36. Id. at 913. The court stated "[tihere is, in short, no evidence that that arbitrator manifestly disre-
garded the law." Id.
37. Id. at 913-14.
38. EDWARD BRUNET ET AL., ARBITRATION LAW IN AMERICA: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT 3 (2006).
39. Folkways Music Publishers, Inc. v. Weiss, 989 F.2d 108, 111 (2d Cir. 1993).
40. See Stephen L. Hayford, Law in Disarray: Judicial Standards for Vacatur of Commercial Arbi-
tration Awards, 30 GA. L. REv. 731,740-43 (1996) [hereinafter Hayford, Law in Disarray].
No.I]
3
McKinney: McKinney: Too Many Motions for Vacatur of Commercial Arbitration Awards
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2007
JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION
costs, speed, finality, and other benefits of arbitration. 4' The degree of arbitral
finality, particularly, distinguishes commercial arbitration from litigation.42
Although finality of arbitration awards is of the utmost importance to promot-
ing the policies behind arbitration, the FAA provides a limited number of grounds
for reviewing arbitration awards.43 These statutory grounds for vacatur are: (1)
where the award was produced by corruption, fraud, or undue means; (2) where
there was evident partiality in the arbitrators, or either of them; (3) where the arbi-
trators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing, upon suffi-
cient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the
controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have
been prejudiced; (4) where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly
executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter
submitted was not made. 44 These grounds reflect congressional intent to protect
parties from rulings that may be unfair, that result in the arbitrator ruling on matter
that the parties had not contracted to arbitrate, or that fail to produce definitive
conclusions on the issues before the arbitrator.45
In addition to the FAA's statutory grounds for vacating arbitration awards,
federal courts have recognized several nonstatutory grounds for vacatur of arbitra-
tion awards: manifest disregard of the law by the arbitrator; an award that con-
flicts with well-established public policy; completely irrational or arbitrary and
capricious awards; and an award failing to draw its essence from the parties' con-
tract.46 The federal circuits do not uniformly recognize non-statutory grounds for
vacatur.47 Further, the circuits are not in consensus regarding proper application
of non-statutory grounds.48 The federal circuits do generally treat motions for
vacatur similarly, as cases in which arbitration awards are overturned are rare in
every circuit.49 Regardless of any jurisdictional differences, "it remains a funda-
mental principle of arbitration law that an award will not be vacated merely be-
cause the arbitrator made a mistake of fact or law." 50 Thus, it remains difficult for
appellants to achieve judicial vacatur of arbitration awards.
41. Id.
42. Stephen Hayford & Ralph Peeples, Commercial Arbitration in Evolution: An Assesment and
Callfor Dialogue, 10 OHIO ST. J. ON DiSP. RESOL. 343, 354 (1995) [hereinafter Hayford, Evolution].
43. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (2000).
44. Id.
45. Stephen L. Hayford, A New Paradigm for Commercial Arbitration: Rethinking the Relationship
Between Reasoned Awards and the Judicial Standards for Vacatur, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 443, 450
(1998) [hereinafter Hayford, Paradigm].
46. See Hayford, Law in Disarray, supra note 40, at 764.
47. Compare Hoffman v. Cargill Inc., 236 F.3d 458, 462 (8th Cir. 2001) (stating that manifest
disregard of the law occurs only where the arbitrators identify the applicable law and then deliberately
choose to ignore it) and Montes v. Shearson Lehman Bros., Inc., 128 F.3d 1456, 1461 (11 th Cir. 1997)
("To manifestly disregard the law, one must be conscious of the law and deliberately ignore it.") with
Butler Mfr. Co. v. United Steelworkers of Am., 336 F.3d 629, 636 (7th Cir. 2003) (stating that mani-
fest disregard of the law is only applicable "where the arbitrator's award actually orders the parties to
violate the law"). See also Hayford, Law in Disarray, supra note 40, at 763-75.
48. Id. at 800.
49. See Hayford, Paradigm, supra note 45, at 500.
50. See Hayford, Evolution, supra note 42, at 354.
[Vol. 2007
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B. Governing Law of the Eleventh Circuit
In addition to the four statutory grounds, the Eleventh Circuit has recognized
three non-statutory grounds for vacatur of commercial arbitration awards. 5 In the
Eleventh Circuit, arbitration awards have been vacated for being arbitrary and
capricious, 52 for enforcement of the award being contrary to public policy, 3 and
where the arbitrator acted in manifest disregard of the law.
54
In Ainsworth v. Skurnick,55 the Eleventh Circuit outlined its arbitrary and ca-
pricious standard for vacatur of commercial arbitration awards. 56 There, the fed-
eral district court instructed the arbitration panel that damages must be awarded in
accordance with binding Florida law.57 Nevertheless, the arbitrators decided not
to award damages.58 The court of appeals noted that "an award is arbitrary and
capricious only if a ground for the arbitrator's decision cannot be inferred from
the facts of the case," and thus held that since the arbitration panel knew that the
law required damages, their refusal to grant damages was clearly arbitrary.59 The
court found that the panel knew the law, and provided no reasonable basis for
deciding to ignore it. The court stated: "In this case, it is not a question of decid-
ing the law and getting it wrong or for some reason disregarding the law. The
decision was simply an apparent arbitrary and capricious denial of relief with no
factual or legal basis."
6
The Eleventh Circuit will also vacate an arbitration award that is found to be
61 6contrary to public policy. In Brown v. Rauscher,62 the Eleventh Circuit stated
that the public policy grounds for vacatur are implicated when enforcement of an
arbitration award compels one party to act in violation of public policy. 63 The
court held that the award did not violate public policy as neither party was re-
quired to act in a way conflicting with any public policy.64 The appellants' argu-
ments, the court noted, were merely stating that the arbitration panel misinter-
preted the law, which is not enough to overturn an arbitration award on any
grounds.
65
Most recently, the Eleventh Circuit has recognized manifest disretard of the
law as a separate doctrine for vacatur of commercial arbitration awards. Accord-
51. William H. Hardie, Arbitration: Post-Award Procedures, 60 ALA. LAW. 314, 323 (1999).
52. Ainsworth v. Skumik, 960 F.2d 939, 941 (1 1th Cir. 1992).
53. Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, 861 F.2d 665, 671 (11 th Cir. 1988).
54. Montes v. Shearson Lehman Bros., Inc., 128 F.3d 1456, 1461-62 (11 th Cir. 1997).
55. Ainsworth, 960 F.2d 939.
56. Id. at 941 (citing Raiford v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 903 F.2d 1410, 1413 (1 lth
Cir. 1990)).




61. Brown v. Rauscher Pierce Refsnes, Inc., 994 F.2d 775, 779 (11th Cir. 1993) (citing Delta Air
Lines, Inc. v. Airline Pilots Ass'n, 861 F.2d 665, 671 (11 th Cir.1988); U.S. Postal Serv. v. Nat'l Ass'n
of Letter Carriers, 847 F.2d 775,777 (11th Cir.1988)).
62. Brown, 994 F.2d 775.
63. Id. at 782.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. See Montes v. Shearson Lehman Bros., Inc., 128 F.3d 1456, 1461-62 (11 th Cir. 1997).
No.l]
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ing to the court of appeals, this ground requires clear evidence that the arbitrator
recognized the rule of the law and deliberately ignored it.67 In Montes v. Sherar-
son Lehman Brothers, Inc.,68 the prevailing party at the arbitration proceeding
contended that the arbitrator could ignore the law if doing so would provide a fair
result.69 The arbitrator accepted the prevailing J0arty's invitation to disregard the
law, and based its ruling on suspect reasoning. The Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals vacated the award because of four relevant facts:
The facts are that: 1) the party who obtained the favorable award had
conceded to the arbitration panel that its position was not supported by
the law, which required a different result, and had urged the panel not to
follow the law; 2) that blatant appeal to disregard the law was explicitly
noted in the arbitration panel's award; 3) neither in the award itself nor
anywhere else in the record is there any indication that the panel disap-
proved or rejected the suggestion that it rule contrary to law; and 4) the
evidence is at best marginal. 7'
Montes remains the only case in which the facts were found sufficient to satisfy
the strict requirements of vacatur on grounds of an arbitrator's manifest disregard
of the law.72
Although the claims are rarely successful, the Eleventh Circuit appears will-
ing to hear vacatur arguments on many grounds. Eleventh Circuit rulings suggest
that just because the circuit has not adopted a particular theory does not mean they
are unwilling to do so.73  For instance, the Eleventh Circuit has taken non-
statutory theories from labor arbitration cases and applied them to the commercial
arbitration context.7 4 The Eleventh Circuit has also been willing to adopt non-
statutory theories from other circuits.75
In addition to a willingness to hear arguments based on new or never-before
successful theories, Eleventh Circuit rulings on non-statutory grounds are consis-
tently fact-specific. The analysis of successful claims frequently focuses on facts
76
rather than a series of standardized tests. Consequently, it would appear that the
Eleventh Circuit has created a situation in which a lack of supporting precedent
should not preclude a non-statutory claim, particularly if the theory has not been
tried before the court and seems to be a fresh and valid argument.
67. Id. at 1461.
68. Montes, 128 F.3d 1456.
69. Id. at 1459.
70. Id. at 1461.
71. Id. at 1464 (Carnes, J., concurring).
72. Rueter v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 440 F. Supp. 2d 1256, 1262 (D. Ala. 2006).
73. See Montes, 128 F.3d at 1460-62 (noting the other circuits that have adopted the manifest disre-
gard standard, and then proceeding to do the same).
74. See Brown v. Rauscher Pierce Refsnes, Inc., 994 F.2d 775, 782 (11th Cir. 1993) (adopting the
public policy standard from a series of labor arbitration cases).
75. Univ. Commons-Urbana, Ltd. v. Universal Constructors Inc., 304 F.3d 1331, 1337 (11th Cir.
2002) (citing Montes v. Shearson Lehman Brothers, Inc., 128 F.3d 1456, 1461-62 (1 th Cir. 1997)).
76. Montes, 128 F.3d at 1464 (Cames, J., concurring).
[Vol. 2007
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C. Sanctions & Commercial Arbitration Awards
Sanctions have played an increasingly more prevalent role in federal litigation
since Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) was amended in
1983.77 Prior to the amendment, sanctions were levied in federal court only if it
was found that counsel had engaged in subjective bad faith.78 The 1983 amend-
ment eliminated the subjective inquiry, providing that the imposition of sanctions
should be based on an objective reasonableness test.79 This change significantly
expanded the scope of sanctions at the federal level.8 °
Expansion of Rule 11 has increased the prevalence with which federal courts
impose sanctions, and has also created legal complications. 8 1 The federal circuits
have unevenly applied Rule 11, and consequently the standards used for imposing
sanctions vary by circuit. 82 Adding to the confusion, the federal courts have vari-
ous means outside of Rule 11 with which to levy sanctions. 83 For instance, courts
may utilize 28 U.S.C. § 1927 to sanction unreasonable or vexatious litigation.84
Courts may also utilize their inherent power to sanction litigants for a multitude of
reasons.85 Like sanctions imposed under Rule 11, other rules, statutes, and powers
have standards and levels of usage that vary by circuit.
86
As in non-arbitration contexts, federal courts differ substantially in imposing
sanctions on baseless appeals of commercial arbitration awards. Some federal
circuits have rarely addressed the issue of sanctions, while other circuits have used
sanctions or the threat of sanctions as an attempt to protect policies behind arbitra-
tion.87 Those federal courts that do address sanctions for frivolously attacking
arbitration awards differ as to which rules and which standards will be applied.88
77. See generally GREGORY P. JOSEPH, SANCTIONS: THE FEDERAL LAW OF LITIGATION ABUSE 1-4
(1994).
78. Id. at 4-5.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 1; see also GEORGINE M. VAIRO, RULE 11 SANCTIONS: CASE LAW, PERSPECTIVES, &
PREVENTIVE MEASURES 2-5 (2003).
81. Id.
82. See generally MELISSA L. NELKEN, SANCTIONS: RULE 11 AND OTHER POWERS (1992) (includes
circuit by circuit survey of Rule 11 usage).
83. See id. at 4-5.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 5 (noting that inherent authority has been invoked as a basis for sanctions in most circuits).
86. Id. at 4-5.
87. See, e.g., El Banco De Seguros Del Estado v. Emplrs Ins. of Wausau, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
27130, * 13 (D. Wis. 2002) ("Courts take a dim view of frivolous lawsuits; they take a particularly dim
view of frivolous efforts to delay compliance with an arbitration award."); Cowle v. PaineWebber,
Inc., 1999 U.S. Dist LEXIS 4702, *16 (D.N.Y. 1999) (declining to impose sanctions, but stating that
the nature of arbitration should preclude the federal courts from serving "as a vehicle to allow the loser
to delay paying those sums that the arbitrators determine to be owed."); Flexible Mfg. Sys PTY v.
Super Prods. Corp., 86 F.3d 96, 101 (7th Cir. 1996) (citing Hill v. Norfolk & Western Ry., 814 F.2d
1192, 1203 ("The promise of arbitration is spoiled if parties disappointed by its results can delay the
conclusion of the proceeding by groundless litigation in the district court followed by groundless
appeal to this court; we have said repeatedly that we would punish such tactics and we mean it."));
Evangeline Tel. Co. v. AT&T Commc'n of the S. Cent. States, 916 F. Supp. 598, 600 (D. La. 1995)
(declining to impose sanctions, but noting that revisiting the arbitrator's decision absent specific alle-
gations of fact would "subvert the arbitration process").
88. Signer v. Refco Secs., LLC, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62717, *6 (D. Colo. 2006) (§ 1927: court
invokes statute to sanction party seeking vacatur as attorneys acted "unreasonably and vexatiously in
No.l]
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Circuit courts have invoked FRCP 11, § 1927, and their inherent authority to sanc-
tion motions for vacatur of commercial arbitration awards.89  Some circuits, if
choosing to use Rule 11 (or another common device) to impose sanctions, will use
a standard identical to that applied in other contexts.90 In other circuits, a court
may use a Rule 11 standard intertwined with a standard particular to the commer-
cial arbitration context. 91 Sill other courts will forego applying Rule 11, and will
assess sanctions based on a standard unique to the context of vacatur of commer-
cial arbitration awards. 92 Regardless of how a circuit has chosen to impose sanc-
tions in the past, sanctions for litigants seeking vacatur will often turn on fact-
based judgments and the court's predisposition toward sanctions.93 Generally, if a
federal circuit chooses to impose sanctions at all, it will only do so in exceptional
circumstances.
94
The Eleventh Circuit appears willing to impose sanctions in a greater number
of situations than its sister circuits. 95 In Harbert, the Eleventh Circuit has made an
attempt to articulate a stricter standard for sanctions for baseless appeals of com-
mercial arbitration awards.
9 6
IV. THE INSTANT DECISION
In B.L. Harbert International, LLC v. Hercules Steel Company,97 the Eleventh
Circuit Court of Appeals first asked whether the arbitrator had acted in manifest
disregard of the law.98 The court began its inquiry by reviewing policy considera-
tions behind the FAA.9 9 The court concluded that these policies could only be
pursuing litigation"); Rueter v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 440 F. Supp. 2d 1256, 1265-66
(D. Ala. 2006) (Rule 11: the court notes that different sanctions options are available, but choosing to
use Rule 11); United Computer Sys. v. AT&T Corp., 107 Fed. Appx. 818, 821 (9th Cir. 2004) (Inher-
ent Power: court invokes inherent power to sanction party seeking vacatur because moving party
"abuse[d] the judicial process").
89. See Corporate Printing Co. v. New York Typographical Union No. 6, 886 F. Supp. 340, 343
(D.N.Y. 1995); see also Cook Chocolate Co., Div. of World's Finest Chocolate, Inc. v. Salomon, Inc.,
748 F. Supp. 122, 130 (D.N.Y. 1990). In addition, Rule 38 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Proce-
dure has been invoked to sanction frivolous appeals seeking to overturn arbitral awards at the appellate
level. Flexible Mfg., 86 F.3d 96, at 101.
90. Spector v. Torenberg, 852 F. Supp. 201, 211 (D.N.Y. 1994); Jardine Matheson & Co. v. Saita
Shipping, Ltd., 712 F. Supp. 423,428-29 (D.N.Y. 1989).
91. Rueter, 440 F. Supp. 2d at 1266-67 (the court notes that motion for sanctions will be analyzed in
light of Harbert and applicable Rule 11 law).
92. United Computer, 107 Fed. Appx. at 821 (sanctions based on inherent power due to abuse of the
judicial process).
93. See Evangeline Tel. Co. v. AT&T Commc'n of the S. Cent States, 916 F. Supp. 598, 599-600
(D. La. 1995) (the court notes that revisiting the arbitrator's decision would subvert the arbitration
process, but uses its discretion in deciding not to impose sanctions); see also Rueter, 440 F. Supp. 2d at
1265 (the court notes that sanctions are particularly relevant in light of the Harbert decision); Montes
v. Shearson Lehman Bros., Inc., 128 F.3d 1456, 1464 (1 1th Cir. 1997) (Carnes, J., concurring) (noting
specific factual circumstances giving rising to a successful claim of manifest disregard of the law).
94. See First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 942 (1995) (vacatur should only be
available in "very unusual circumstances," manifest disregard being one such circumstance).
95. B.L. Harbert Int'l v. Hercules Steel Co., 441 F.3d 905, 913-14 (11 th Cir. 2006).
96. Id.
97. 441 F.3d 905 (11 th Cir. 2006).
98. Id. at 906.
99. Id. "The Federal Arbitration Act liberally endorses and encourages arbitration as an alternative
to litigation." Id. "The reasons for this strong pro-arbitration policy are 'to relieve congestion in the
[Vol. 2007
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furthered by ensuring that arbitration remains an alternative to litigation, rather
than a preliminary stopping point before protracted appellate review in the
courts. IOO
In light of this policy consideration, the court addressed Harbert's claim of
manifest disregard of the law.' 0' The court noted that manifest disregard is one of
three non-statutory grounds for vacating arbitration awards recognized by the
Eleventh Circuit.' ° 2 The court recognized that manifest disregard has been an
acce ptable basis for challenging arbitration awards since the court ruled in Mon-
tes. ° 3 The court stated that, while a valid theory, manifest disregard will only be
applicable in exceptional circumstances.' °4 The court reviewed the Montes case
and concluded that the circumstances in which a manifest disregard theory will
prevail are extremely rare. 105 The court further stated that in every case other than
Montes in which an arbitration loser brought a manifest disregard claim the court
has upheld the arbitration award. 10 6
The court then evaluated the substance of Harbert's arguments.0 7 The court
concluded that Habert's argument that the arbitration award clearly contradicted
the terms of the contract was simply another way of arguing clear error on the part
of the arbitrator.1°8 However, the court clarified that the arbitration loser must
establish more than clear error; the losing party must show that the arbitrator rec-
ognized a valid rule of law and chose to ignore it."° 9 The court stated that Harbert
argued a two-part contrary position. "o
First, the court noted that Harbert argues that the contract is part of the law
that the arbitrator must apply, and thus any misapplication of the contract is a
misapplication of the law."' The court concluded that this argument fails from
the start because a mere error of law is not enough to overturn an arbitration
award. 12 The second part of Harbert's argument is based on dicta from the
court's holding in Univ. Commons-Urbana, Ltd. v. Universal Constructors, Inc."
3
The Univ. Commons court stated that, "theoretically, we suppose, the arbitrators'
approach to the award of damages could be in disregard of the law altogether, if it
differed from the provisions of the contract."' 4 The instant court concluded that
courts and to provide parties with an alternative method for dispute resolution that is speedier and less
costly than litigation."' Id. (quoting Caley v. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp., 428 F.3d 1359, 1367 (11 th
Cir. 2005)).
100. Id.
101. Id. at 909.
102. Id. at 910.
103. Montes v. Shearson Lehman Bros., 128 F.3d 1456 (11 th Cir. 1997).
104. Harbert, 441 F.3d at 910.
105. Id. at 911.
106. Id.; see, e.g., Peebles v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., 431 F.3d 1320 (11th Cir.
2005); Univ. Commons-Urbana, Ltd. v. Universal Contractors, Inc., 441 F.3d 1320 (11 th Cir. 2002);
Brown v. IT Consumer Fin. Corp., 211 F.3d 1217 (11 th Cir. 2000).
107. Harbert, 441 F.3d at 911-13.
108. Id. at 911-12.
109. Id. at 912.
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this "speculative dicta" is not a rule of law, and is contrary to settled Eleventh
Circuit precedent."
5
The court continued its analysis by applying the facts at hand to those found
relevant for a successful manifest disregard claim in the Montes case. Ix6 In the
instant case, the court explained that there is no factual support that the arbitrator
decided the case based on anything other than his best judgment as to how to ap-
ply the law to the facts. 1 7 Further, the court pointed out that there is no proof that
Hercules persuaded the arbitrator to ignore the relevant law." 8 The court con-
cluded by stating that there is no evidence that the arbitrator manifestly disre-
garded the law.
19
After making its legal conclusions, the court continued to state that Harbert
deprived Hercules and the courts of the benefits of arbitration. 20 According to the
court, baseless appeals, like the one made by Harbert in the instant case, subvert
the goals of arbitration.12  The court then warned future parties seeking vacatur
that the Eleventh Circuit will be willing to consider sanctions in appropriate cases
where a party is making claims with no real legal basis.
22
The court considered imposing sanctions in the instant case, but decided not
to do so for three reasons.1 23 First, the court stated that the argument regarding the
Univ. Commons dicta provided some merit to the motion, albeit questionable.'
24
Second, Hercules did not move for sanctions, and according to the 2court this fact
should be considered when deciding whether to impose sanctions.' Third, Har-
bert did not have the benefit of the warning that the court's opinion provides.
126
The court concluded by stating that, while Harbert did not have the benefit of
notice, future litigants who pursue similar vacatur motions will, and they will be
sanctioned accordingly. 127
V. COMMENT
A. District Courts Respond to Harbert
District courts within the Eleventh Circuit have quickly responded to Har-
bert's warning. Since Harbert was decided, district courts in the Eleventh Circuit





119. Id. "The facts of this case do not come within shouting distance of the Montes exception." Id. at
911.
120. Id. at 913-14.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 914.
124. Id.
125. Id. The court noted that a sanctions motion by Hercules was not necessary as the court may raise
the sanctions issue sua sponte. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. See SH1 Invs., Inc. v. Jenks, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51753 (D. Fla. 2006); Rueter v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 440 F. Supp. 2d 1256 (D. Ala. 2006).
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Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith129 was decided in United States District Court for
the Northern District of Alabama, Southern Division.' 30 Rueter (the plaintiff)
advanced multiple theories in an attempt to vacate an unfavorable arbitration
award.13 ' The Court found that none of these theories stood up to the various
Eleventh Circuit standards for vacatur of commercial arbitration awards.' 32 The
court also addressed Merrill Lynch's motion for Rule 11 sanctions.' 33 The court
found that Merrill Lynch's motion did not meet the procedural requirements for
Rule 11 sanctions, but ruled that, pursuant to Harbert, a court can impose sanc-
tions sua sponte.134 The court noted that the Harbert opinion did not address
which particular standard, statute, or rule courts should use to impose sanctions,
but the court decided to proceed with a Rule 11 analysis as there is well-
established law for imposing sanctions for frivolous claims under Rule 11.135 The
court held that in light of Harbert and the applicable Rule 1 1 law, sanctions
should be imposed because Rueter's legal theory had no reasonable chance of
success, and could not be advanced as a reasonable argument to change existing
law.' 3 6 The court awarded costs and reasonable attorney's fees.1
37
Thereafter, on July 27, 2006, the United States District Court for the Middle
District of Florida, Tampa Division, decided SII Invs., Inc. v. Jenks.138  SII
claimed manifest disregard of the law by the arbitrator-a claim that, according to
the court, amounted to a claim of clear error. 39 The court found that the arbitra-
tors had ample evidence from which they could make their decision, and noted
that, regardless of their findings, clear error does not amount to manifest disre-
gard.' 4° Further, the court noted that like the findings in Harbert, the manifest
disregard claim did not come close to matching the factual scenario present in
Montes. 14 ' Accordingly, the court addressed sanctions under Rule 11.142 Accord-
ing to the court, Harbert "not only warns potential litigants, it directs the district
courts to forcefully implement the goals of the FAA by making parties understand
they should adhere to the exacting standards for judicial review or face conse-
quences."'' 43 The court found that SH's arguments were "perverse" and nearly
identical to those condemned in Harbert, and thus awarded Jenks reasonable at-
torney's fees. 44
129. 440 F. Supp. 2d 1256 (D. Ala. 2006).
130. Id.
131. Id. at 1259.
132. Id. at 1262-66.
133. Id. at 1265.
134. Id. at 1266. The court noted that Merrill Lynch's answer stated that they would be seeking
sanctions. Id. According to the court the answer was enough to put Rueter on notice, but notice would
not be required under Harbert. Id.
135. Id. at 1265-66.
136. Id. at 1267.
137. Id.
138. 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51753 (D. Fla. 2006).
139. Id. at *16.
140. Id.
141. Id. at *11-12.
142. Id. at *13-19.
143. Id. at *18.
144. Id. at * 16-20. The court noted that SH had an opportunity to avoid sanctions through Rule 11 's
safe-harbor provision, but instead adopted a "never-say-die" attitude that Harbert specifically con-
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In light of these two holdings, it is clear that district courts are taking Har-
bert's announcement seriously. Attorneys must be wary of making legal argu-
ments that do not stand up to the Eleventh Circuit's standards for non-statutory
claims. Moving to vacate on a manifest disregard theory is unwise, unless the
factual circumstances come exceedingly close to matching the "rare" circum-
stances present in the Montes case.
B. Harbert's Mandate Is Not Warranted
The Harbert holding has clear practical implications, but the court's stern
warning and exasperation are not warranted in light of the Eleventh Circuit's past
treatment of motions for vacatur.' 45 The Eleventh Circuit has traditionally been
flexible in its approach to appeals of commercial arbitration awards. They have
been willing to hear arguments advocating adoption of additional non-statutory
grounds for vacatur from other circuits, and from labor arbitration. 46 However,
this flexible approach to new arguments does not coincide with Harbert, and the
conflicting signals sent by the Eleventh Circuit prove troublesome.
Particularly concerning, in light of the Eleventh Circuit's past willingness to
adopt precedent from other circuits, is a recent opinion from the Fourth Circuit
that is at odds with Harbert. In Patten v. Signator Ins. Agency, Inc., 147 an em-
ployee sought to vacate a labor arbitration award in favor of his former em-
ployer.148 The court stated that the arbitrator had read into the contract a limita-
tions clause where none existed. 149 The court found that two agreements between
the parties were relevant, but a later agreement, the "management agreement,"
containing no limitations clause, superseded the earlier "mutual agreement."' 
50
The court held that the arbitrator, by reading terms into the parties' second arbitra-
tion agreement, had acted in manifest disregard of the law, and failed to draw the
essence of the agreement. 151
In reaching its holding, the Patten court inferred that the arbitrator had ig-
nored the contract language, revising the agreement based on his "personal no-
tions of right and wrong."' 152 Although the court made this inference, there was no
substantial evidence of intent to ignore the law, as there was in Montes.'53 The
possibility that a court could make such an inference regarding the arbitrator's
intent would have added substantial weight to the plaintiff's arguments in Har-
bert.
Given the Eleventh Circuit's willingness to adopt non-statutory standards
from other circuits, it is certainly possible that they may choose to adopt a stance
demned. Id. at *14 (citing B.L. Harbert Int'l v. Hercules Steel Co., 441 F.3d 905, 913 (11th Cir.
2006)).
145. Harbert, 441 F.3d at 914 ("[Tlhis Court is exasperated by those who attempt to salvage arbitra-
tion losses through litigation that has no sound basis in the law applicable to arbitration awards.").
146. See supra notes 73-75 and accompanying text.
147. 441 F.3d 230 (4th Cir. 2006).
148. Id.
149. Id. at 235.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 236.
153. Id. at 237 (Luttig, J., dissenting).
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similar to the Fourth Circuit's. The Eleventh Circuit could do so by amending its
manifest disregard standard, or adopting the failure to draw the essence standard.
If such a standard was in place, it would not have been fair to sanction the plaintiff
on Harbert's facts, as the vacatur claim would have had a colorable justification.
The Harbert court did not foreclose the possibility that new standards could be
adopted, as the court did not proscribe arguments advocating new theories. The
Harbert court did state that they wanted to deter claims with "no sound basis in
the law applicable to arbitration awards," but if anything is clear about the law of
arbitration awards in the Eleventh Circuit, it is that the law is constantly subject to
change. 1
54
C. Harbert's Impact on Commercial Arbitration
Years will pass before Harbert's effects on commercial arbitration as a whole
will be fully realized. While Harbert's threat of sanctions suggests that the num-
ber of motions for vacatur will decline, this will not necessarily result. The num-
ber of appeals seeking vacatur of commercial arbitration awards has never been
exceedingly high, and the number of successful claims has been particularly
low. 55 Together, these notions suggest, not that appeals will increase or decrease,
but that attorneys, wishing to remain zealous advocates, will attempt to find new
ways to persuade courts if they believe a case's specific factual scenario warrants
vacatur. In other words, the limited number of parties believing they can make a
successful claim will not change, but the ways in which they argue their claims
will. The court may be seeking to address this kind of creativity by shutting the
door on all claimants. Although the court does not make it clear, the holding in
Harbert may signal change from a policy of willingness to hear new arguments on
new theories, to an unfavorable view of vacatur motions generally. The Harbert
court may be saying that they have heard enough, and the holding may be an at-
tempt to reign in all motions for vacatur. If this is true, the Harbert court would
be making a substantial step in moving vacatur law back to where it was before
the adoption of non-statutory theories.
In the short term, certainly, the number of frivolous appeals like those found
in Harbert or SII will decline, particularly appeals based on theories of manifest
disregard. Further, litigants in the Eleventh Circuit are on notice that sanctions are
a serious possibility. This notice will promote the goals of arbitration most com-
monly addressed by the Eleventh Circuit: speed, low costs, and relieving conges-
tion in the courts.' Harbert should also have the immediate effect of promoting
other benefits of arbitration, particularly finality and autonomy, both very impor-
tant in the commercial context. Parties that contract for arbitration agreements do
not wish to have their names and reputations dragged through the courts by appel-
lants that have adopted "never-say-die" attitudes, and this sort of attitude has be-
come exceedingly dangerous post-Harbert.
154. B.L. Harbert Int'l v. Hercules Steel Co., 441 F.3d 905, 914 (11 th Cir. 2006).
155. See Hayford, Paradigm, supra note 45, at 452.
156. See Harbert, 441 F.3d 905 at 906 (citing Caley v. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp., 428 F.3d 1359,
1367 (1 lth Cir. 2005) (The pro-arbitration policy exists "to relieve congestion in the courts and to
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What immediate benefits Harbert will have for the underlying policies of ar-
bitration may be offset by the confusion and complexities that the holding may
create. Confusion may arise because Harbert creates the possibility of a new
body of substantive law. The Eleventh Circuit, post-Harbert, will have bodies of
law regarding statutory, and non-statutory claims for vacatur, a body of law ad-
dressing the proper analysis for sanctions under various rules, statutes, and judi-
cial authority, and now, a body of law pertaining to the standards for sanctioning
motions for vacatur of commercial arbitration awards. Each of these bodies of
law leaves room for the zealous advocate to find grey areas in which to advance
claims, whether genuine or otherwise. Such complexity lends itself to the creation
of colorable arguments that address new ambiguities, and leaves claimants with
new questions regarding which arguments may be sanctioned. If the Eleventh
Circuit and other federal courts truly wish to support the policies behind the FAA
and of arbitration generally, they should first obtain a degree of uniformity or
consensus before they add more mass to the post-award mire.
VI. CONCLUSION
In the instant case, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals made it clear that
they are upset with what they consider a high number of frivolous appeals of
commercial arbitration awards. The court's anger, though, does not seem valid in
light of the Eleventh Circuit's past-treatment of vacatur. The Harbert holding
should cause litigants to give pause before advancing suspect claims, but parties
with legitimate claims are left with greater confusion as to which arguments are
permissible and which will warrant sanctions. District courts within the Eleventh
Circuit are following Harbert's mandate, but it remains to be seen whether the
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